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The New Basel Capital Accord: Implications 
for US Agricultural Lenders
Ani L. Katchova and Peter J. Barry
The first Basel Capital Accord, the current system used
for evaluating capital adequacy, was implemented in 1988
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The
accord’s objectives are to ensure the soundness and stabil-
ity of the banking system, to achieve greater uniformity in
capital standards across countries, and to provide equitable
standards promoting bank competition. The current
accord, also known as Basel I, sets the minimum regula-
tory capital for banks at 8% of the risk-weighted value of
their assets. The guidelines proposed in Basel I were
accepted by more than 100 countries. Basel I, however,
turned out to be too simplistic to address the needs of the
banking system in a changing environment of new tech-
nology and increased globalization and competition.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has
been developing a new accord, Basel II, to address the
shortcomings of the current accord and to reflect the new
developments in the assessment and management of risk.
The Committee has developed several proposals for revis-
ing the existing accord and has conducted four quantita-
tive impact studies related to these proposals (posted at the
Bank for International Settlements’ website, http://
www.bis.org). Basel II is expected to be implemented by
the end of 2006.
Overview of Basel II
Basel II rests on three mutually reinforcing pillars: (1)
minimum capital requirements, (2) supervisory review,
and (3) market discipline.
Pillar 1 outlines the calculation procedures of the capi-
tal requirements for banking organizations. Under Basel I,
the minimum required capital ratio (set at 8%) is calcu-
lated as the regulatory capital divided by the risk exposure
(measured by the risk-weighted assets). The difference
under Basel II will be that the risk exposure will be evalu-
ated as the total of the credit risk, market risk, and opera-
tional risk exposure of the bank, where more refined
measures will be incorporated to calculate credit and oper-
ational risk.
Pillar 2 addresses the supervisory review process in
ensuring sound capital management and comprehensive
assessment of the risks and the capital adequacy of the
banking institutions. This pillar seeks to increase the trans-
parency and accountability of the banking system and to a
large extent has already been incorporated in the United
States.
Pillar 3 aims at improving market discipline by requir-
ing banks to publicly disclose key information regarding
their risk exposures and capital positions. Because Basel II
gives banking institutions greater discretion in calculating
their own capital requirements, it is anticipated that the
disclosure statements will allow market participants to bet-
ter assess the safety and soundness of the banking environ-
ment and thus exert stronger market discipline.
Basel II will include three options for measuring credit
risk and another three options for measuring operational
risk. The options for calculating credit risk are the stan-
dardized approach and two internal ratings-based
approaches—the  foundation approach and the advanced
approach. The standardized approach is similar to the
approach currently used for categorizing bank assets
according to their risk and then weighing them using fixed
weights. Under the internal ratings-based approaches,
banks will evaluate key elements of credit risk: the proba-
bility of default, the loss given default, the exposure at
default, and the remaining maturity of the exposure.
Under the foundation approach, banks will estimate the
probability of default of their loans, but the regulators will
provide the other measures. Finally, under the advanced
approach, banks will calculate all key elements of their
credit risk exposures. 40 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
Likewise, there are three options
for calculating operational risk: the
basic indicator approach, the standard-
ized approach, and the advanced mea-
surement approach, with varying
degrees of bank-provided versus reg-
ulator-provided inputs in the calcula-
tions of operational risk. As
incentives for adopting the more
advanced approaches for credit and
operational risks, banks are antici-
pated to experience lower capital
requirements.
Basel II Implementation in the 
United States
The US banking agencies (the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the Office of Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the
Office of Thrift Supervision) have
already initiated the process for
implementing Basel II. These agen-
cies have recommended that the larg-
est, most complex banks (with total
assets of at least $250 billion or total
foreign exposure of at least $10 bil-
lion) be required to implement the
advanced measurement approaches
of Basel II to assess credit and opera-
tional risks (Federal Reserve Board,
2003). Currently, ten banks meet
these size requirements, and another
ten banks have chosen to adopt the
advanced approaches of Basel II.
These twenty banks account for 99%
of the foreign assets and more than
65% of the total assets held by US
lenders. It is expected that over time
other large banking and nonbank
institutions will also choose to adopt
advanced capital calculations.
The banking agencies have iden-
tified several areas of concern regard-
ing the implementation of Basel II in
the United States (Federal Reserve
Board, 2003). The first concern is
the equitability of a bifurcated
scheme whereby large banks will be
required to adopt Basel II while small
banks will continue to operate under
the existing Basel I. Small banks that
remain under the current capital
regime would generally have higher
capital requirements, which would
also be less sensitive to risk. Thus,
these small banks would be at a com-
petitive disadvantage. However, the
banking agencies predict that Basel II
may not have a large impact on capi-
tal holdings, because many small
banks currently choose to hold capi-
tal in excess of the required mini-
mum. The second concern is that the
adoption of advanced approaches for
measuring credit and operational risk
may be too expensive, especially for
smaller banks. The adoption of these
approaches, of course, will not reduce
losses but rather will better align cap-
ital requirements and losses. How-
ever, even if not required by Basel II,
these approaches may be needed in
order to compete effectively in the
existing banking environment. The
third concern is the way operational
risk is treated, either as an explicit
capital charge under pillar 1 or on a
case-by-case basis under pillar 2.
Basel II and Agriculture
The New Basel Accord does not
include any special treatment for
agricultural lending. Basel II implies
that large agricultural loans would be
treated as corporate loans and small
agricultural loans as retail loans. The
regulators, however, need to take into
account the particular characteristics
o f  f a r m  l o a n s  w h e n  s e t t i n g  c a p i t a l
charges for organizations involved in
agricultural lending (Barry, 2001).
Farm businesses are characterized by
cyclical performance, seasonal pro-
duction patterns, high capital inten-
sity, leasing of farmland,
participation in government pro-
grams, and annual payments of real
estate loans. Because of these charac-
teristics, losses in agricultural lending
may not be frequent, but could be
large due to high correlations among
farm performances. At the same
time, high capital intensity, especially
involving farmland, offers relatively
strong collateral positions, thus miti-
gating the severity of default when
default problems do arise.
Katchova and Barry (2005)
developed models for quantifying
credit risk in agricultural lending.
They calculated probabilities of
default, loss given default, portfolio
risk, and correlations using data from
farm businesses. The authors showed
that the calculated expected and
unexpected losses under Basel II criti-
cally depend on the credit quality of
the loan portfolio and the correla-
tions among farm performances.
These analyses of portfolio credit risk
could be further enhanced if seg-
mented by primary commodity and
geographical location. Agricultural
lenders could adopt similar models to
quantify credit risk, a key component
in the calibration of minimum capi-
tal requirements.
Farm Lending Institutions
Among agricultural lending institu-
tions, commercial banks and the
Farm Credit System are the largest
providers of credit. Commercial
banking in the United States has long
been characterized by a large number
of smaller community banks, many
of which are heavily dependent on
agriculture. Deregulation and consol-
idations are reducing the number of
banks, although federal data for 2004
indicate that approximately 2,600
“agricultural” banks still provide
more than 50% of bank loans to agri-
culture. However, the share of agri-
cultural loans held by banks with1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1) CHOICES 41
more than $500 million of assets has
been growing rapidly. Such larger
banks likely have the capabilities to
move toward the adoption of the
internal ratings-based approaches to
risk assessment and capital manage-
ment, whereas smaller banks serving
different market niches will probably
remain under the current standard-
ized approach.
The Farm Credit System (FCS) is
a federated organization of five
mostly wholesale banks lending to
90–100 farmer-owned lending asso-
ciations, which in turn provide credit
and related services to agricultural
borrowers. Autonomy of individual
units of the FCS has been high,
although recent consolidations, busi-
ness practices, product and service
offerings, risk assessment, and capital
management have become more uni-
form over time. Uniformity helps the
FCS to present a more understand-
able, coherent structure to the
national and international financial
markets. Investors in these markets,
in turn, purchase securities issued by
the FCS banks, thus providing the
loan funds for agricultural borrowers.
In general, the FCS has sufficient
size, specialization, and expertise to
move toward adopting the internal
ratings-based approaches to capital
management. Initial steps have
involved the design of data systems
needed to compile and store loan-
level loss data over time and the
development of dual rating systems
for categorizing the frequency and
severity of default by borrowers. The
goals are to achieve greater precision
and granularity in risk classifications.
These steps will lead to the formula-
tion of economic capital models that
combine measures of credit, market,
and operational risks to determine
capital adequacy, risk-adjusted
returns on capital, and risk-adjusted
pricing of loans and services.
Essential to the adoption of more
advanced internal ratings-based
approaches is the acceptance by fed-
eral regulatory agencies—the Farm
Credit Administration in the case of
the FCS and the Fed, Comptroller of
the Currency, and the FDIC for
commercial banks. Basel II requires a
formal approval process for the mea-
surement, modeling, and manage-
ment of risk-based capital. Thorough
documentation, rigorous testing,
complete validation, and ongoing use
are key elements of gaining and
maintaining approval.
In Conclusion
As occurred under Basel I, the new
spectrum of choices for capital man-
agement under Basel II will be widely
reflected throughout the financial
system. The scope and depth of Basel
II have followed the “best practices”
of the top tier of banks worldwide.
Such successful practices typically
permeate a financial system with
modifications to fit institutional size
and resource base. Vendors offering
fee-based capital services, further
consolidations among financial insti-
tutions, data sharing arrangements,
and experience gained by the indus-
try and its regulators will hasten the
permeation process and enable com-
munity banks—as well as the inter-
nationally active ones—to utilize
internal ratings-based approaches
and economic capital concepts in
their risk management.
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